Whereas in the last one or two decades, the United States has been emphasizing the realization of the idea of new world order and specifically speaking of a new order in the Middle East, not only has that idea and slogan been forgotten for a long time, but it has been replaced by a new rival called Axis. The resistance consists of Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Palestine.
If past is prologue, President Joe Biden’s administration is likely to face early challenges in the Middle East, whether from adversaries deliberately attempting to gauge its resolve, a chance event that tests American leadership, or both. Even without intentional efforts to challenge the new president, the kaleidoscopic nature of the post-Arab Spring regional landscape ensures that incoming officials will have to deal with substantial tensions, discord, and complex diplomatic challenges involving both friends and adversaries.
But in the new circumstances and in the coming months, the United States will inevitably adopt new policies in the face of this strong and growing united front. While Biden’s America has raised the science of serious struggle against China and Russia, and while it does not shy away from any escalation of pressure on the Axis of Resistance, it is well aware that escalating pressure on Trump is not the answer, especially in dealing with the Axis of Resistance.
In the case of Iran, Biden inherits a complex issue called the nuclear issue, which not only did not stop due to pressure at the surrender station, but also became more serious, and is now growing far beyond the US and European legal framework. Iranians’ equality on the nuclear issue has now become a global example for the world seeking independence.
In Lebanon, all kinds of hard and soft pressures not only did not lead to the surrender of Hezbollah and its weapons but also went in the direction that robbed Israel of peace and stability. And, of course, the project of demarcating the new border between Lebanon and Israel has become a nightmare for Israel and, of course, the United States.
In Syria, 10 years of crisis and insecurity have not only failed to materialize but in the light of the harshest conditions imposed by US sanctions, known as Caesarea, elections will be held in the next few months to elect a legitimate president.
In Iraq, the axis of resistance and, of course, the Iraqi people strongly insist the need to expel the occupiers from this country.
In an article on American Web “Washington Institute” written by,
Potential Tests From Iran
The most daunting challenge could be an Iranian attack in the waning hours of the Trump administration on January 20, to avenge the killing of Gen. Qasem Soleimani one year earlier and reprise the inauguration day release of U.S. embassy hostages in 1981. Tehran may calculate that the Trump administration would not have time to launch a significant response before leaving office, while the Biden administration might not be inclined to do so immediately upon entering office. Iranian leaders may also assume that an attack would create leverage over the new administration.
Even if it eschews such an attack, Tehran will likely use various nonkinetic means to pressure the Biden administration into rejoining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action without making concessions of its own. Earlier this month, for example, it violated JCPOA caps by resuming its enrichment of uranium to 20 percent, then seized a South Korean-flagged tanker, which it apparently hopes to trade for $7 billion of Iranian funds held in escrow by Seoul.
In addition, the regime might attempt a number of other actions:
- Barring access to nuclear inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency
- Encouraging proxies to ramp up attacks on U.S. interests in Iraq using rockets and improvised explosive devices
- Prodding Yemen’s Houthi rebels to intensify attacks on Saudi Arabia or launch strikes on Israel
- Accelerating efforts to divert foreign oil tankers in the Persian Gulf
- Resuming its harassment of U.S. naval vessels
- Testing a ballistic missile to a range exceeding its current claimed cap of 2,000 kilometers, thereby signaling rejection of any limits on its missile program
- Attempting a destructive cyberattack against the U.S. financial sector or critical infrastructure
- Attacking Israeli territory or interests in retaliation for the country’s presumed role in two incidents last year: the sabotage of the Natanz centrifuge assembly plant and the killing of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. Iranian attacks of this sort could result in escalation that requires U.S. crisis diplomacy.
Potential Tests From Syria
The Assad regime may see an opportunity to retake territory currently outside its control by renewing pressure on U.S. forces in al-Tanf, Deir al-Zour, and the northeast, perhaps in cooperation with Russia, Iran, and its proxies. Such action could include efforts to flip the Kurdish-led Democratic Union Party (PYD), which forms the backbone of the U.S.-supported SDF, or to lure away some of the SDF’s Arab tribal units. The return of regime forces might in turn give the Islamic State renewed opportunities to recruit new terrorists and regain strength in these areas. Regime forces might also use chemical weapons (CW) in one of the country’s remaining pockets of resistance, forcing the Biden administration to define its policy regarding CW use and violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Potential Tests From Hezbollah
In recent years, Hezbollah’s most important strategic project has been the Iranian-supported effort to produce upgraded rockets and missiles in Lebanon—a program that was started in part because weapons sent from Iran are often interdicted en route. Hezbollah intends to retrofit hundreds of heavy rockets with guidance packages and manufacture highly accurate missiles at underground workshops in densely populated areas of Beirut. If it obtains large numbers of these precision missiles, the group could saturate Israel’s defenses, target its critical infrastructure, and inflict serious long-term harm on its economy and morale. For this reason, the precision project is also critical for Iran, which considers Hezbollah’s rocket and missile force as part of its strategic deterrent.
Israel has declared that it will not allow Hezbollah to complete these workshops and has worked tirelessly toward that end, with much success so far. Its efforts include interdicting shipments of missiles, components, and production equipment in Syria. For its part, Iran has tried—without success—to thwart Israeli aerial interdiction operations by bolstering its air defenses in Syria. Once the Biden administration is in place, Tehran might intensify these efforts in order to provoke an escalatory response, in the hope that Washington will press Israel to halt airstrikes in Syria and related reconnaissance overflights of Lebanon. If interdiction efforts falter, Israel might accept greater risk in undertaking these airstrikes, which could increase the potential for escalation in Syria or—less likely—a war with Hezbollah Resistance Group in Lebanon.
And finally, in Palestine, Palestinian militants, after years of deprivation of rule in their homeland, will register their first political re-election next month, and it is interesting to note that during the past, both when they were in power and when they were in power. In short, the only thing they have not forgotten is the slogan that the solution to the Palestinian problem is jihad, and that is enough.
In such circumstances, it seems that the only solution left for the United States is for Biden to formally acknowledge the impact of the pressures on the axis of resistance on the one hand, and to confront this motivated and determined phenomenon from an equal stand on the other.
